A new era for automatic suspensions under the Procurement Act 2023?

The case of Parkingeye Ltd v Velindre University NHS Trust [2026] EWHC 1019 (TCC)  (“Parkingeye”) marks the first judicial interpretation of the Procurement Act 2023 (“the Act”) and potentially signals a significant shift in how automatic suspensions are treated in procurement challenges.

Background

In Parkingeye the claimant was an unsuccessful bidder who challenged the award of a contract by the defendant. 

The case centred on the application of the new rules under the Act regarding the lifting of automatic suspensions and required the court to interpret these provisions for the first time.

Automatic Suspension

An automatic suspension arises when a bidder issues proceedings disputing a contract award, thus preventing the contracting authority from entering into the contract unless the court orders otherwise. 

Under the previous regime which was laid down in the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (“the Regulations”), courts applied the American Cyanamid test which sets out the principles governing whether an interim injunction should be granted, with particular emphasis on whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the claim in question. 

In practice this approach had a tendency to lead to contracting authorities being successful in lifting suspensions.

In Parkingeye, it was held that the Act introduces a different approach. 

Under section 102(2) of the Act, the court must consider:

• the public interest, including lawful procurement and avoiding delays in delivering services;
• the interests of suppliers, including the adequacy of damages; and
• any other relevant factors.

Critically, public interest is now a primary consideration rather than a secondary factor.

In Parkingeye, HHJ Keyser KC made clear that this change is substantive. 

HHJ Keyser KC’s underscored that the new statutory test under the Act places the public interest at the forefront when considering whether to maintain an automatic suspension following a contract award challenge. 

The judgment clarifies that courts must now weigh the public interest, the interests of suppliers, which includes the adequacy of damages, and any other relevant factors, with public interest generally favouring the retention of suspension. 

This approach marks a significant shift from the previous regime, where the adequacy of damages often determined the outcome, to a new approach that prioritises the integrity of the procurement process and raises the threshold for lifting suspensions.

HHJ Keyser KC observed that the public interest will “generally tend in favour of keeping the suspension in place”, marking a clear departure from the previous emphasis on allowing projects to proceed. 

While each case remains fact‑specific, the judgment in Parkingeye suggests that lifting a suspension will now require either a compelling public interest or an overriding private interest.

The Parkingeye judgment effectively raises the bar for contracting authorities, tending in favour of the upholding of a suspension.

Where the adequacy of damages had previously determined the outcome, the focus of the court has shifted to protecting the integrity of the procurement process itself.

Contracting authorities may now face increased difficulty in progressing projects where the award of the contract is contested, which may impact project timelines and delivery. 

By contrast, bidders may find that the automatic suspension is a more powerful tool, strengthening their position in disputes, preserving the ability to seek remedies beyond damages and potentially encouraging more challenges to award.

Although Parkingeye is a first‑instance decision and may yet be appealed, it provides an early indication that the regime under the Act is potentially more claimant‑friendly. 

If the precedent is followed in subsequent cases i procurement strategy may be reshaped by increasing both the risks of challenge for authorities and the remedies available to bidders.

If you require advice in relation to procurement awards or disputes, then please contact our Team promptly as the period set out in the Act for an award to be challenged is very short, generally at 30 days from when you first knew, or reasonably out to have known, the circumstances gave rise to a potential claim.