Employment status: was a lifeboat volunteer a worker?

The case of Martime and Coastguard Agency v Martin Groom considered whether a lifeboat volunteer qualified as a ‘worker’ and was therefore entitled to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing. The Court of Appeal has now considered this question of status, a decision that is likely to have significant implications for employers across all sectors.  

Facts

Mr Groom volunteered as a Coastguard Rescue Officer (CRO). In May 2020, he was invited to attend a disciplinary hearing, following which his position as CRO was terminated. He asked to be accompanied at his appeal hearing by a representative from his trade union, GMB. This request was refused, the appeal was unsuccessful, and he was subsequently issued with a P45. 

Mr Groom brought an employment tribunal claim arguing that he was entitled to be accompanied to a disciplinary hearing because he was a ‘worker’. 

The law 

Under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, employees and workers have the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary or grievance hearing by either a trade union representative or a colleague. 

A ‘worker’ is defined under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as an individual who has entered into, or works under (or previously worked under), any contract which they undertake to perform work or services personally for another party to the contract, provided that the other party is not a client or customer of a profession or business carried on by the individual. 

Employment tribunal

At the preliminary hearing, the tribunal considered whether Mr Groom met the legal test for ‘worker’ status. It concluded that he did not, as he was never contractually obliged to provide work or services to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). 

Employment Appeal Tribunal

On appeal, the EAT disagreed and held that Mr Groom was a ‘worker’. It emphasised that the term ‘volunteer’ is not a work of art. The key issue is whether a contract exists between the parties and, if so, its nature. In this case, the EAT found there was “plainly” a contract between Mr Groom and the MCA, which included a right to payment. Mr Groom was a worker when carrying out activities for which he could be paid, though not necessarily when performing tasks that did not attract payment.

Court of Appeal

MCA appealed to the Court of Appeal. 

Mr Groom relied on three documents - the Volunteer Handbook, the Code of Conduct, and a remuneration document - which showed that while a CRO was free to choose when to work and was not obliged to attend on any particular occasion, once they did attend, they had to follow reasonable instructions. They were also entitled to claim remuneration for much of that work. 

In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal observed that it was “unreal to say that there was no intention to create legal relations between the parties". A contract was formed when a CRO attended an activity for which remuneration could be claimed. 

The Court of Appeal further held that mutuality of obligation existed once a CRO attended for work: the CRO had to comply with reasonable instructions, and MCA had to pay him once he submitted a claim.  

It distinguished Mr Groom's case from ‘true volunteer cases’ such as South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v Grayson, where volunteers received no payment beyond travel expenses and there was no legal obligation to provide them with work when they attended. By contrast, the MCA's remuneration document included a section on “claims for time (hourly rate) remuneration” and described payments as “compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment”. The Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT that payment in compensation for interference with a person's use of their time is the essence of remuneration. 

Finally, the Court of Appeal confirmed that recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that the absence of an obligation to work does not preclude 'worker’ status. Although CROs had considerable freedom to accept or decline work, this did not detract from their status as workers. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that Mr Groom was a worker. 

What this means for employers? 

This case highlights the importance of determining an individual's status correctly from the outset. Each case must be assessed on its own facts. The Court of Appeal referred to X v Mid-Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau which said that “volunteers come in many shapes and sizes, and it cannot be assumed that all with have the same status in law”.  

Status has significant implications because it dictates the rights to which the individual is entitled. Genuine volunteers have no employment rights, whereas workers have several important rights including the right to receive the national minimum wage, paid holiday, protection against unlawful deductions from wages, and whistleblowing protections. 

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