How does caravan site licensing interact with the planning regime? – The latest ruling of the Court of Appeal

In Haytop Country Park Ltd v Amber Valley Borough Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1442 (“Haytop”), the Court of Appeal has affirmed the need for harmony between planning control under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the “TCPA 1990”) and the licensing of caravan sites under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (the “1960 Act”).

Background

Haytop Country Park Ltd (the “Appellant”) owned a caravan site subject to enforcement notices issued by Amber Valley Borough Council (the “Respondent”) requiring the removal of extensive terracing and installation of hardstanding which had been installed without planning permission. The Respondent had also issued a tree replacement notice under s207 TCPA 1990. Appeals to the Planning Inspectorate and High Court against these notices were unsuccessful. Subsequently, when the Appellant applied for a new site licence, the Respondent granted a licence for only three caravans citing the need to not interfere with the requirements of the tree planting and enforcement notices.

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (the “FTT”)

On appeal to FTT, the licence was amended to encompass occupation of up to 18 caravans on the basis that whilst the Respondent was right to have considered the requirements of the tree replacement notice, it should have disregarded the enforcement notice. Further, the FTT acknowledged that grant of a licence gives rise to permitted development rights under the General Permitted Development Order 2015 (“GDPO 2015”) for any development necessary in order to comply with the terms of the licence.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (the “UT”)

The UT overturned the FTT’s decision on the basis that the Respondent should not have imposed a condition as to the number of caravans which was inconsistent with the established planning position. The UT said that all major planning issues should be resolved before a site licence application could sensibly be determined, citing s.3(3) of the 1960 Act for support. The FTT’s reasoning gave rise to an irrational situation whereby a site licence is granted irrespective of an enforcement notice which as a result gives rise to permitted development rights which prevent the enforcement notice from being relied upon.

The Court of Appeal was asked to resolve the differing views of the FTT and UT and determine whether the site licence decision could lawfully disregard the requirements of the enforcement notice.

The Appellant’s arguments:

Central to the Appellant’s argument was the contention that conditions may only be imposed on a site licence under the 1960 Act for site licensing purposes and not for purely planning purposes.

The Appellant argued the UT had erred in law in finding that it was irrational for a site licence to authorise Class B Rights which were inconsistent with the operation of the enforcement notice. The Appellant maintained that the purpose of a licence was to control “the details” of the use of a site and that it was inherent in planning legislation that a subsequent decision can allow for development inconsistent with an enforcement notice.

Further, the Appellant relied on the established principle from Mansi v Elstree District Council (1964) 15 P & CR 153) (“Mansi”) that remedial steps in an enforcement notice cannot remove existing planning rights and that an enforcement notice should be interpreted so as not to interfere with any permitted development rights under the GDPO 2015. This, the Appellant maintained, meant that it would be irrational for the Respondent to enforce against and obtain the removal of hardstanding which could then be put back immediately under a Class B right arising from a site licence.

The decision:

Lord Justice Holgate remarked on the circular nature of the Appellant’s argument. The contention that an enforcement notice does not prevent reliance in the future on permitted development rights (and therefore that it would be irrational to require their removal) logically must depend on a prior licensing decision as to how many plots should be authorised which would give rise to these rights. Thus, the Appellant erred in trying to rely on the principle in Mansi when there was no existing planning rights for the enforcement notice to rely on.

In respect of whether pure planning considerations can be considered when granting a site licence, Lord Justice Holgate found that considering the terms and effect of planning permission were a pre-requisite for the grant of a licence. He agreed with reasoning in the Scottish case of Cartledge v Scottish Ministers (No.1) (2011) S.C. 587 where it was held that it is not open to the licensing authority to enlarge a planning permission and the principle laid down in CR v Kent Justices ex parte Crittenden [1964] I QB 144 that the site licence has to be in harmony with the terms of the planning permission and its conditions. Following on from this, it was perfectly legitimate for the Council and UT to have considered the enforcement notice which forms part of the “planning baseline” of the site and that to not permit this would be contrary to the harmony expounded in Crittenden.

Considering the above, the Court of Appeal concluded that the determination of the site licence had to consider the enforcement notice. The Appellant had failed to show that development was required by the previous site licence and so there was no Class B permitted development rights. The decision not to approve any plots in areas where remedial actions needed to be taken was entirely consistent with the necessary harmony of the 1960 act with the proper application of the planning regime. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision was not unlawful.

Conclusion

Following this decision, the interaction between the planning and site licensing regimes is significantly less muddy. It’s clear that licensing authorities not only can but must ensure coherence between the scope of the licence granted and the site’s existing planning baseline so as not to frustrate the purposes of planning control.

Chyna Fairclough-Jones is a solicitor in the planning and environment team at Irwin Mitchell